Chapter VI. The Doctrine of No Soul: Anatta
第六章 无我论
What in generally is suggested by Soul, Self, Ego, or to use the Sanskrit expression Ātman, is that in man there is a permanent, everlasting and absolute entity, which is the unchanging substance behind the changing phenomenal world. According to some religions, each individual has such a separate soul which is created by God, and which, finally after death, lives eternally either in hell or heaven, its destiny depending on the judgment of its creator. According to others, it goes through many lives till it is completely purified and becomes finally united with God or Brahman, Universal Soul or Ātman, from which it originally emanated. This soul or self in man is the thinker of thoughts, feeler of sensations, and receiver of rewards and punishments for all its actions good and bad. Such a conception is called the idea of self.
一般用到‘灵魂’、‘自我’、‘个我’或梵文里的‘神我’( Atman)(编者注： Atman其实只是‘我’的意思，一般均译为‘神我’，沿用已久，但是否与奥义书及吠檀多之哲学相符，甚可置疑。)这些字眼的时候，它们所提示的意义是：在人身中有一恒常不变、亘古长存的绝对实体。这实体就是那千变万化的现象世界背后不变的实质。照某些宗教说，每一个人都有一个个别的灵魂，这灵魂是上帝所创造的。人死后，它即永久地生活在地狱或天堂里，而它的命运则完全取决于它的创造主的裁判。依另一些宗教的说法，这灵魂可以历经多生，直到完全净化，最后乃与上帝或梵天或神我合一，因为当初它就是从这里面流出来的。这个人身中的灵魂或自我是思想者、感受者、一切善恶行为所得奖惩的领纳者，这种的观念叫做我见。
Buddhism stands unique in the history of human thought in denying the existence of such a Soul, Self, or Ātman. According to the teaching of the Buddha, the idea of self is an imaginary, false belief which has no corresponding reality, and it produces harmful thoughts of 'me' and 'mine', selfish desire, craving, attachment, hatred, ill-will, conceit, pride, egoism, and other defilements, impurities and problems. It is the source of all the troubles in the world from personal conflicts to wars between nations. In short, to this false view can be traced all the evil in the world.
在人类的思想史中，佛教是独一无二不承认这灵魂、自我或神我的存在者。根据佛的教诫，我见是虚妄的邪信，与真实绝不相侔。它只能产生‘我’、‘我的’之类有害的思想、自私的欲望、贪求、执著、憎恨、嗔恚、贡高、我慢、自利主义，以及其它染污不净法等种种问题。它是世间一切纷扰的泉源：从个人间的冲突，以至国与国间的战争，莫不以此为根由。简言之，世间一切邪恶不善法，无一不可溯源到这一邪见。
Two ideas are psychologically deep-rooted in man; self-protection and self-preservation. For self-protection man has created God, on whom he depends for his own protection, safety and security, just as a child depends on its parent. For self-preservation man has conceived the idea of an immortal Soul or Ātman, which will live eternally. In his ignorance, weakness, fear, and desire, man needs these two things to console himself. Hence he clings to them deeply and fanatically.
人的心理上，有两种根深蒂固的意念：自卫与自存。为了自卫，人类创造了上帝，靠上帝得到保护、安全与依怙，就像小孩依赖父母一样。为了自存，人类想出了灵魂(神我)不灭的主意，俾得亘古长存。由于他的愚昧、懦弱、恐惧与贪婪，人类需要这两件东西来安慰自己。因此，他紧紧地、狂热地抓住它们。
The Buddha's teaching does not support this ignorance, weakness, fear, and desire, but aims at making man enlightened by removing and destroying them, striking at their very root. According to Buddhism, our ideas of God and Soul are false and empty. Though highly developed as theories, they are all the same extremely subtle mental projections, garbed in an intricate metaphysical and philosophical phraseology. These ideas are so deep-rooted in man, and so near and dear to him, that he does not wish to hear, nor does he want to understand, any teaching against them.
佛的教诫不但不助长这愚昧、怯懦、恐惧与贪欲，反从釜底抽新将这些(劣根性)连根芟除，以使人类得到正觉为目的。根据佛教，上帝与灵魂的概念，是虚妄不实的。虽然神学是一项高度发展的理论，它们仍然只是极精微的前尘心影，不过穿上了深奥难懂的形上学以及哲学名词的外衣而已。这些意念之根深蒂固而为人类所亲所爱，使得人类不愿听闻、更不愿了解任何与之相违反的教诫。
The Buddha knew this quite well. In fact, he said that his teaching was 'against the current' (patisotagāmi), against man's selfish desire. Just four weeks after his Enlightenment, seated under a banyan tree, he thought to himself; 'I have realized this Truth which is deep, difficult to understand… comprehensible only by the wise… Men who are overpowered by passions and surrounded by a mass of darkness cannot see this Truth, which is against the current, which is lofty, deep, subtle and hard to comprehend.'
佛对这点甚为熟知。事实上，他曾说过，他的教诫是反潮流的，是违反人类自私的欲念的。在他证正觉才四个星期的时候，他坐在一棵榕树底下，如是自思：‘我已证入真理。此理艰深，难见难解，......惟智者能知之......为强烈的欲望所征服而为黑暗所包围的人，不能见此真理。这真理是反潮流的，崇高、深奥、微妙、难知。’
With these thoughts in his mind, the Buddha hesitated for a moment, whether it would not be in vain if he tried to explain to the world the Truth he had just realized. Then he compared the world to a lotus pond: In a lotus pond there are some lotuses still under water; there are others which have risen only up to the water level; there are still others which stand above water and are untouched by it. In the same way in this world, there are men at different levels of development. Some would understand the Truth. So the Buddha decided to teach it. [1]
他心里这样想著，佛曾一度犹豫。如将他所证真理，解释与世人知悉，是否将徒劳无功？然后他将世间比作一座莲池：在莲池中，有些莲花还淹没在水底，有些已长到水面，有些则已透出水面而不为水所沾濡。同样的，在这世间也有各种根器不同的人。有些人会了解这真理的，佛这才决定说法。［注一］
The doctrine of Anatta or No-Soul is the natural result of, or the corollary to, the analysis of the Five Aggregates and the teaching of Conditioned Genesis (Paticca-samuppāda). [2]
无我论(或称灵魂非有论)是缘起论的推论，也是分析五蕴所得到的自然结果。［注二］
We have seen earlier, in the discussion of the First Noble Truth (Dukkha), that what we call a being or an individual is composed of the Five Aggregates, and that when these are analysed and examined, there is nothing behind them which can be taken as 'I', Ātman, or Self, or any unchanging abiding substance. That is the analytical method. The same result is arrived at through the doctrine of Conditioned Genesis which is the synthetical method, an according to this nothing in the world is absolute. Everything is conditioned, relative, and interdependent. This is the Buddhist theory of relativity.
在前文讨论第一圣谛(苦谛)的时候，已说明所谓众生或个人是由五蕴综合而成。将五蕴予以分析审察，找不到在它们幕后另有一个可以称之为我、神我或自我的长住不变的实质。这是分析法，但用合成法的缘起论，也能得到同样的结果。根据缘起论，世间没有一件事物是绝对的。每一件事物都是因缘和合的(由条件构成的)、相对的、互为依存的。这就是佛教的相对论。
Before we go into the question of Anatta proper, it is useful to have a brief idea of the Conditioned Genesis. The principle of this doctrine is given in a short formula of four lines:
在正式讨论无我的问题之前，对于缘起论应有一个简明的概念。这一项教义可用四句简短的公式来代表它：
When this is, that is (Imasmim sati idam hoti);
This arising, that arises (Imassuppādā idam uppajjati);
When this is not, that is not (Imasmim asati idam na hoti);
此有故彼有，此生故彼生；
此无故彼无，此灭故彼灭。［注三］
This ceasing, that ceases (Imassa nirodhā idam nirujjhati). [3]
On this principle of conditionality, relativity and interdependence, the whole existence and continuity of life and its cessation are explained in a detailed formula which is called Paticca-samuppāda 'Conditioned Genesis', consisting of twelve factors:
在这缘起、相对、互存的原则下，整个生命的存在、持续，以迄寂灭，都在一条叫做缘起法则的公式里解释得十分周详。这法则共分十二部分：
Through ignorance are conditioned volitional actions or karma-formations (Avijjāpaccayā samkhārā).
一、因为无知，乃有种种意志的活动而成业(无明缘行)。
Through volitional actions is conditioned consciousness (Samkhārapaccayā viňňānam).
二、因为有种种意志的活动，乃有知觉的生起(行缘识)。
Through consciousness are conditioned mental and physical phenomena (Viňňānapaccayā nāmarūpam).
三、因为有知觉，乃有精神与肉体的现象产生(识缘名色)。
Through mental and physical phenomena are conditioned the six faculties (i.e., five physical sense-organs and mind) (Nāmarūpapaccayā salāyatanam).
四、因为有了精神与肉体的现象发生，乃有六根的形成(名色缘六入)。
Through the six faculties is conditioned (sensorial and mental) contact (Salāyatanapaccayā phasso).
五、因为有六根，乃有(感官与心灵)对外境的接触(六入缘触)。
Through (sensorial and mental) contact is conditioned sensation (Phassapaccayā vedanā).
六、因为有(感官与心灵)对外境的接触，乃生起种种感受(触缘受)。
Through sensation is conditioned desire, 'thirst' (Vedanāpaccayā tanhā).
七、因为有种种感受，乃生起种种贪欲‘渴(爱)’(受缘爱)。
Through desire ('thirst') is conditioned clinging (Tanhāpaccayā upādānam).
八、因为有种种贪爱，乃产生执取不舍(爱缘取)。
Through clinging is conditioned the process of becoming (Upādānapaccayā bhavo).
九、因为有执取不舍，乃有存在(取缘有)。
Through the process of becoming is conditioned birth (Bhavapaccayā jāti).
十、因为有存在，乃有生命(有缘生)。
Through birth are conditioned (12) decay, death, lamentation, pain, etc. (Jātipaccayā jarāmaranam…).
十一、因为有生命，乃有十二、败坏、死亡、哀伤、痛苦等(生缘老病死忧悲苦恼)。
This is how life arises, exists and continues. If we take this formula in reverse order, we come to the cessation of the process: Through the complete cessation of ignorance, volitional activities or karma-formations cease; through the cessation of volitional activities, consciousness ceases; … through the cessation of birth, decay, death, sorrow, etc., cease.
生命便像这样生起、存在、持续。假使我们将这公式的顺序倒过来，便得出如下的缘灭的逆定理：
(灭)，因为意志活动止息，知觉也同时止息(行灭则识灭)......乃至因为生命的止息而一切败坏死亡哀伤等等一应俱灭。
It should be remembered that each of these factors is conditioned (paticcasamuppanna) as well as conditioning (paticcasamuppāda). [4] Therefore they are all relative, interdependent and interconnected, and nothing is absolute or independent; hence no first cause is accepted by Buddhism as we have seen earlier. [5] Conditioned Genesis should be considered as a circle, and not as a chain. [6]
于此应该明白熟知的是：这缘起法则的每一部分，一方面是由众多条件(缘)和合而生( conditioned缘生的)，另一方面又同时构成其它部分生起的条件(condition-ing 缘起的)。［注四］因此，它们之间的关系，完全是相对的、互为依存的、互相联结的。没有一事一物是绝对独立的。所以，佛教不接受最初因，这在前文已讲过。缘起法则是一个首尾相接的环，而不是一条直线的链子。［注五］
The question of Free Will has occupied an important place in Western thought and philosophy. But according to Conditioned Genesis, this question does not and cannot arise in Buddhist philosophy. If the whole of existence is relative, conditioned and interdependent, how can will alone be free? Will which is included in the fourth Aggregate (samkhārakkhandha), like any other thought, is conditioned (paticca-samuppanna). So-called 'freedom' itself in this world is not absolutely free. That too is conditioned and relative. There is, of course, such a conditioned and relative 'Free Will', but not unconditioned and absolute. There can be nothing absolutely free in this world, physical or mental, as everything is conditioned and relative. If Free Will implies a will independent of conditions, independent of cause and effect, such a thing does not exist. How can a will, or anything for that matter, arise without conditions, away from cause and effect, when the whole of life, the whole of existence, is conditioned and relative? Here again, the idea of Free Will is basically connected with the ideas of God, Soul, justice, reward and punishment. Not only so-called free will is not free, but even the very idea of Free Will is not free from conditions.
自由意志的问题，在西方的思想界与哲学界中，占有很重要的地位。但是根据缘起法，这问题在佛教哲学中是不存在的，也是不能生起的。既然整个的存在是相对的、有条件的(因缘和合的)、互为依存的，我们何能单独自由？意志与其他思想一样是缘生的。所谓‘自由’，其本身就是相对的、缘生的。无论是肉体或精神方面，没有一件事物是绝对自由的，因为一切都是相对的、互为依存的。自由意志的含义，是一个与任何条件及因果效应无关的意志。但是整个生存界都是有条件的(缘成的)、相对的、受因果律支配的。在这里面，如何可能产生一个意志，或任何一样事物，与条件及因果无关？此处所谓自由意志的观念，基本上仍与上帝、灵魂、正义、奖惩等观念相连结。不但所谓自由意志并不自由，甚至自由意志这一观念都不是无条件的。
According to the doctrine of Conditioned Genesis, as well as according to the analysis of being into Five Aggregates, the idea of an abiding, immortal substance in man or outside, whether it is called Ātman, 'I', Soul, Self, or Ego, is considered only a false belief, a mental projection. This is the Buddhist doctrine of Anatta, No-Soul or No-Self.
根据缘起法则，也根据众生为五蕴和合而成的这一分析，在人身内或身外，有一常住不变的实质，名为神我、我、灵魂、自我、个我，这一观念，只能被认为是一种邪信、一种心造的影像。这就是佛教的无我论或称灵魂非有论。
In order to avoid a confusion it should be mentioned here that there are two kinds of truths: conventional truth (sammuti-sacca, Skt. Samvrti-satya) and ultimate truth (paramattha-sacca, Skt. Paramārtha-satya). [7] When we use such expressions in our daily life as 'I', 'you', 'being', 'individual', etc., we do not lie because there is no self or being as such, but we speak a truth conforming to the convention of the world. But the ultimate truth is that there is no 'I' or 'being' in reality. As the Mahāyāna-sūtrālankāra says: 'A person (pudgala) should be mentioned as existing only in designation (prajňapti) (i.e., conventionally there is a being), but not in reality (or substance dravya)'. [8]
为了避免混淆，于此必须申明，真理有两种：世俗的真理(俗谛)与最高的真理(真理)。［注六］我们在日常生活中，用我、你、众生、个人等名词的时候，不能因为实无我及众生等而将上项名词视为妄语。这些名词在世俗共认的意义来说，也是真实的。但是，最高的真理，却是实际上并无我与众生。在《大乘庄严经论》里就说：‘当知“补特伽罗”只是假名安立(依世俗说，有所谓众生)，并无实义。’［注七］
'The negation of an imperishable Ātman is the common characteristic of all dogmatic systems of the Lesser as well as the Great Vehicle, and, there is, therefore, no reason to assume that Buddhist tradition which is in complete agreement on this point has deviated from the Buddha's original teaching.' [9]
大小乘各宗派的共同特色，就是否定有不灭的神我。因此，就没有理由假定在这一点上完全一致的佛教传统，已经与佛的原始教诫有了偏差。［注八］
It is therefore curious that recently there should have been a vain attempt by a few scholars[10] to smuggle the idea of self into the teaching of the Buddha, quite contrary to the spirit of Buddhism. These scholars respect, admire, and venerate the Buddha and his teaching. They look up to Buddhism. But they cannot imagine that the Buddha, whom they consider the most clear and profound thinker, could have denied the existence of an Ātman or Self which they need so much. They unconsciously seek the support of the Buddha for this need for eternal existence-of course not in a petty individual self with small s, but in the big Self with a capital S.
因此，最近有少数学者［注九］，竟然违反佛教精神，妄图将‘我’观念，私自输入到佛的教义之中，实在是奇怪之极。这些学者对于佛及其教义备极尊崇，仰佛教如泰山北斗。但是他们无法想像如佛这般头脑清晰、思虑精深的思想家，竟能将他们所热切需要的神我、自我予以否认。他们下意识地寻求佛陀的支应，以满足他们对永生的需要——当然不是个人的小我，而是大‘我’的永生。
It is better to say frankly that one believes in an Ātman or or Self. Or one may even say that the Buddha was totally wrong in denying the existence of an Ātman. But certainly it will not do for any one to try to introduce into Buddhism an idea which the Buddha never accepted, as far as we can see from the extant original texts.
索性坦白地相信有神我、自我，甚至明白指摘佛不承认有神我自我为错误，都无所谓。可是应要将佛从来不曾接受过的的一种观念注入于佛教之中，那就不成了。这种观念在现存的原始佛典中，就我们所见，是不为佛所接受的。
Religions which believe in God and Soul make no secret of these two ideas; on the contrary, they proclaim them, constantly and repeatedly, in the eloquent terms. If the Buddha had accepted these two ideas, so important in all religions, he certainly would have declared them publicly, as he had spoken about other things, and would not have left them hidden to be discovered only 25 centuries after his death.
相信有上帝与灵魂的宗教，并不以这两种观念为秘密。相反的，他们还经常不断地反覆宣扬它们，极尽辩才吹擂之能事。如果佛曾经接受这两种在一切宗教中极为重要的观念，他一定会公开宣布，如同他谈论其它事物一样，而不会将它们秘藏起来，以留待他圆寂二千五百年后的人来发现。
People become nervous at the idea that through the Buddha's teaching of Anatta, the self they imagine they have is going to be destroyed. The Buddha was not unaware of this.
可是人们一想到佛教的无我，会将他们幻想的‘我’毁灭，神经就紧张了起来。佛对这一点并不是不知道。
A bhikkhu once asked him: 'Sir, is there a case where one is tormented when something permanent within oneself is not found?'
有一个比丘有一次问佛：‘世尊！是否有人因为发现身内无有常住实性而遭受痛苦折磨呢？’
'Yes, bhikkhu, there is,' answered the Buddha. 'A man has the following view: “The universe is that Ātman, I shall be that after death, permanent, abiding, ever-lasting, unchanging, and I shall exists as such for eternity”. He hears the Tathāgata or a disciple of his, preaching the doctrine aiming at the complete destruction of all speculative views… aiming at the extinction of “thirst”, aiming at detachment, cessation, Nirvāna. Then than man thinks: “I will be annihilated, I will be destroyed, I will be no more.” So he mourns, worries himself, laments, weeps, beating his breast, and becomes bewildered. Thus, O bhikkhu, there is a case where one is tormented when something permanent within oneself is not found.' [11]
‘有的，比丘！’佛答道。‘有人执持这种见解：“宇宙就是神我，我死后即将与之合一，常住不变，亘古永存。我将这样地存在，以迄永远。”当他听到如来及其弟子所弘传的教义，目的在摧毁一切臆见(戏论)......消灭‘渴(爱)’，达到无著、寂灭、涅槃时，那人自忖：“我要被消灭了，我要被毁掉了，我将不再存在。”于是他就哀伤、忧虑、焦急不安、椎胸痛哭而精神恍惚，不知如何是好。所以，比丘，因为身内找不到常住实体而为痛苦所折磨的人是有的。’［注十］
Elsewhere the Buddha says: 'O bhikkhus, this idea that I may not be, I may not have, is frightening to the uninstructed world-ling.' [12]
在别的经里，佛也说过：‘比丘们啊！这个没有“我”也没有“我所”的意念，对于无识的凡夫是骇人的。’［注十一］
Those who want to find a 'Self' in Buddhism argue as follows: It is true that the Buddha analyses being into matter, sensation, perception, mental formations, and consciousness, and says that none of these things it self. But he does not say that there is no self at all in man or anywhere else, apart from these aggregates.
想在佛教中找出一个‘我’来的人，是这样辩论的：‘诚然，佛将众生分析为色受想行识，并说这五者中没有一样是“我”。但是他并没有说除了五蕴之外，人身内或其他地方，就完全没有“我”了。’
This position is untenable for two reasons:
这种立论有两种站不住的理由：
One is that, according to the Buddha's teaching, a being is composed only of these Five Aggregates, and nothing more. Nowhere has he said that there was anything more than these Five Aggregates in a being.
第一：根据佛说，众生仅由五蕴和合而成。除此之外再无别物。没有一部经中，佛曾说众生身中除了五蕴尚有他物。
The second reasons is that the Buddha denied categorically, in unequivocal terms, in more than one place, the existence of Ātman, Soul, Self, or Ego within man or without, or anywhere else in the universe. Let us take some examples.
第二：佛曾在不只一部经中，毫不含糊地断然否认人身中或身外或在宇宙中之任何一处有神我、灵魂、自我、个我的存在。今试举例以明之：
In the Dhammapada there are three verses extremely important and essential in the Buddha's teaching. They are nos. 5, 6 and 7 of chapter XX (or verses 277, 278, 279).
在巴利文《法句经》中，有三首偈极关重要而为佛教之精义。这三首偈就是第二十章的第五、六、七等三偈(或全经中的第二七七、二七八、二七九等三偈)
The first two verses say:
第一、第二两偈中有道：
'All conditioned things are impermanent' (Sabbe SAMKHĀRĀ aniccā), and 'All conditioned things are dukkha' (Sabbe SAMKHĀRĀ dukkhā).
‘一切有为的事物，都是无常的(诸行无常)。’以及‘一切有为的事物，都是苦的(诸行皆苦)。’
The third verse says:
第三偈却道：
'All dhammas are without self' (Sabbe SAMKHĀRĀ anattā). [13]
‘一切法都是没有“我”的(诸法无我)。’［注十二］
Here it should be carefully observed that in the first two verses the word samkhārā 'conditioned things' is used. But in its place in the third verse the word dhammā is used. Why didn't the third verse use the word samkhārā 'conditioned things' as the previous two verses, and why did it use the term dhammā instead? Here lies the crux of the whole matter.
这里请特别注意，在第一、二偈中所使用的是‘有为的事物(行)’一词，但在第三偈中则改用‘法’字了。为什么第三偈不也和一、二偈一样地用‘行’(有为的事物)而要用‘法’字呢？整个的关键就在这里。
The term samkhāra [14] denotes the Five Aggregates, all conditioned, interdependent, relative things and states, both physical and mental. If the third verse said: 'All samkhārā (conditioned things) are without self', then one might think that, although conditioned things are without self, yet there may be a Self outside conditioned things, outside the Five Aggregates. It is in order to avoid misunderstanding that the term dhammā is used in the third verse.
原来，行［注十三］的意思，就是五蕴与一切缘起、依存、相对的事物(精神的和肉体的都在内)。假如第三偈也说：‘一切行(有为的事物)都是没有我的’，那末有人也许会想：虽然有为的事物中无我，但在有为的事物之外，五蕴之外，也许仍有一个‘我’吧！就是为了避免这种误会，所以第三偈中才用了‘法’字。
The term dhamma is much wider than samkhārā. There is no term in Buddhist terminology wider than dhamma. It includes not only the conditioned things and states, but also the non-conditioned, the Absolute, Nirvāna. There is nothing in the universe or outside, good or bad, conditioned or non-conditioned, relative or absolute, which is not included in this term. Therefore, it is quite clear that, according to this statement: 'All dhammas are without Self', there is no Self, no Ātman, not only in the Five Aggregates, but nowhere else too outside them or apart from them. [15]
‘法’字的意义比‘行’字要广大得多。在佛教中，没有一个术语的涵义，比‘法’字更广的了。它不仅包括有为的事物，也包括了无为的‘绝对性’与涅槃。世出世间、善恶、有为无为、相对绝对，没有一样事物不包括在这一个‘法’字中。因此，根据此一申义，‘诸法无我’很显然的是说不仅五蕴之中无我，在五蕴之外或离开五蕴依然无我。［注十四］
This means, according to the Theravāda teaching, that there is no self either in the individual (puggala) or in dhammas. The Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy maintains exactly the same position, without the slightest difference, on this point, putting emphasis on dharma-nairātmya.
无论在人(补特伽罗)或法中，都没有我。大乘佛教的态度亦复如是。在这点上，与上座部一般无二。不仅强调法无我，也强调人无我。
In the Alagaddūpama-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya, addressing his disciples, the Buddha said: 'O bhikkhus, accept a soul-theory (Attavāda) in the acceptance of which there would not arise grief, lamentation, suffering, distress and tribulation. But, do you see, O bhikkhus, such a soul-theory in the acceptance of which there would not arise grief, , lamentation, suffering, distress and tribulation?'
在《中部经》中的《阿勒葛度帕玛经》Alagaddupama-sutta(译者注：约相当于汉译《中阿含》第二零零《阿梨吒经》里，佛向弟子们说：‘比丘们啊！你们可以接受灵魂实有论，只要接受了这一理论，一切忧悲苦恼便不再生起。但是，比丘们啊！你们见到过这样的灵魂实有论吗？接受了它就可以使忧悲苦恼不再生起？’
'Certainly not, Sir.'
‘当然没有啰，世尊！’
'Good, O bhikkhus. I, too, O bhikkhus, do not see a soul-theory, in the acceptance of which there would not arise grief, lamentation, suffering, distress and tribulation.' [16]
‘好极了，比丘们。比丘们啊！我也从未见过有这样的灵魂实有论，接受了它忧悲苦恼便不再生起。’［注十五］
If there had been any soul-theory which the Buddha had accepted, he would certainly have explained it here, because he asked the bhikkhus to accept that soul-theory which did not produce suffering. But in the Buddha's view, there is no such soul theory, and any soul-theory, whatever it may be, however subtle and sublime, is false and imaginary, creating all kinds of problems, producing in its train grief, lamentation, suffering, distress, tribulation and trouble.
如果曾经有过为佛所接受的灵魂实有论(有我论)，他一定会在上节经文里予以阐释，因为他曾要比丘们接受不会产生痛苦的灵魂实有论。但在佛的看法，这样的灵魂实有论是没有的。任何的灵魂实有论，无论它是如何高深微妙，都是虚妄幻想，徒然制造各种问题，随之产生一连串的忧悲、苦恼、灾难、困扰等等。
Continuing the discourse the Buddha said in the same sutta:
'O bhikkhus, when neither self nor anything pertaining to self can truly and really be found, this speculative view: “The universe is that Ātman (Soul); I shall be that after death, permanent, abiding, ever-lasting, unchanging, and I shall exist as such for eternity”- is it not wholly and completely foolish?' [17]
在同一经中，佛接下去又说：‘比丘们啊！我以及与我有关的任何事物(我所)既然确确实实是不可得的，所谓“宇宙就是神我(灵魂)；我死后就成为神我，常住不变，亘古长存，我将如是存在以迄永远”的臆见，岂不是十十足足的愚痴？’［注十六］
Here the Buddha explicitly states that an Ātman, or Soul, or Self, is nowhere to be found in reality, and it is foolish to believe that there is such a thing.
这里，佛清清楚楚的说出神我、灵魂、我实际上是不可得的。相信有这么一件东西，乃是再愚蠢不过的事。
Those who seek a self in the Buddha's teaching quote a few examples which they first translate wrongly, and then misinterpret. One of them is the well-known line Āttā hi attano nātho from the Dhammapada (XII, 4, or verse 160), which is translated as 'Self is the lord of self', and then interpreted to mean that the big Self is the lord of the small self.
想在佛教中找‘我’的人，也举出若干例子。这些例子，先是他们把它翻译错了，之后又加以曲解。一个有名的例子，就是《法句经》第十二章第四节，也就是第一六零偈。他将原文的Atta hi attano natho先译成‘“我”是我的主宰’，然后又将偈文解释为大‘我’是小我的主宰。
First of all, this translation is incorrect. Āttā here does not mean self in the sense of soul. In Pali the word āttā is generally used as a reflexive or indefinite pronoun, except in a few cases where it specifically and philosophically refers to the soul-theory, as we have seen above. But in general usage, as in the XII chapter in the Dhammapada where this line occurs, and in many other places, it is used as a reflexive or indefinite pronoun meaning 'myself', 'yourself', 'himself', 'one', 'oneself', etc. [18]
先说，这翻译根本不正确。此地的Atta并不是含有灵魂意义的‘我’。在巴利文中，atta一字除了在少数情形下，特指哲学里的灵魂实有论(有我论)如前文所见者外，通常均用为反身或不定代名词。在《法句经》第十二章这句偈文里以及其它许多地方，它就是用反身或不定代名词。其意义是我自己、你自己、他自己、某人、某人自己等。［注十七］
Next, the word nātho does not mean 'lord', but 'refuge', 'support', 'help', 'protection'. [19] Therefore, Attā hi attano nātho really mean 'One is one's own refuge' or 'One is one's own help' or 'support'. It has nothing to do with any metaphysical soul or self. It simple means that you have to rely on yourself, and not on others.
其次， natho的意义，并不是‘主宰’，而是依怙、支援、救助、保护。［注十八］因此，Atta hi attano natho的真正意义，是‘人当自作依怙’或‘人当自助(支援自己)’。这话与任何形而上的灵魂或‘我’都不相干。它的意义很简单，只是：人应当依靠自己，不可依赖他人。如此而已。
Another example of the attempt to introduce idea of self into the Buddha's teaching is in the well-known words Attidipā viharatha, attasaranā anaňňasaranā, which are taken out of context in the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta. [20]This phrase literally means: 'Dwell making yourselves your island (support), making yourselves your refuge, and not anyone else as your refuge.' [21]
另一个想将‘我’的观念注入到佛教中的例子，就是《大般涅槃经》中被断章取义的名句Attadipa viharatha attasarana anannasarana。［注十九］这句子的字义是‘以你自己作为你的岛屿(支应)而安住，以你自己作为你的依怙，而不以任何其它的人作为你的皈依处。’［注二十］那些想在佛教中见到‘我’的人，却将attadipa和att-asarana 两字曲解为‘以“我”为明灯’，‘以“我”为皈依’。［注二十一］
We cannot understand the full meaning and significance of the advice of the Buddha to Ānanda, unless we take into consideration the background and the context in which these words were spoken.
我们将无法了解佛给阿难这项诰诫的全部意义及其重要性，除非我们将这些话的背景与上下文加以考虑。
The Buddha was at the time staying at a village called Beluva. It was just three months before his death, Parinivāna. At this time he was eighty years old, and was suffering from a very serious illness, almost dying (māranantika). But he thought it was not proper for him to die without breaking it to his disciples who were near and dear to him. So with courage and determination he bore all his pains, got the better of his illness, and recovered. But his health was still poor. After his recovery, he was seated one day in the shade outside his residence. Ānanda, the most devoted attendant of the Buddha, went to his beloved Master, sat near him, and said: 'Sir, I have looked after the health of the Blessed One, I have looked after him in his illness. But at the sight of the illness of the Blessed One the horizon became dim to me, and my faculties were no longer clear. Yet there was one little consolation: I thought that the Blessed One would not pass away until he had left instructions touching the Order of the Sangha'.
佛那时正住在一处叫做竹芳邑的村子里，离他的圆寂(般涅槃)刚好三个月。当时他年已八十，正患重病，濒临死亡。但他认为如果不向那些他所深爱而亲近的弟子们宣布这一噩耗，遽尔死去，是不当的。因此，他鼓起勇气，决心忍受一切痛苦，克服他的疾病而复元了。但是他的健康仍然很差。他病愈之后，有一天坐在户外一处浓荫之下，他最忠勤的侍者阿难，来到他所爱的师尊身边坐了下来，就说：‘世尊，我曾照顾世尊的健康，我曾为世尊侍疾。但是一看到世尊生病，我就觉得天昏地黑、神志不清了。我只有一个小小的安慰。我自思世尊在没有留下有关僧团的教诲之前，是不会逝世的。’
Then the Buddha, full of compassion and human feelings, gently spoke to his devoted and beloved attendant: 'Ānanda, what does the Order of the Sangha expect from me? I have taught the Dhamma (Truth) without making any distinction as exoteric and esoteric. With regard to the truth, the Tathāgata has nothing like the closed fist of the teacher (ācariya-mutthi). Surely, Ānanda, if there is anyone who thinks that he will lead the Sangha, and that the Sangha should depend on him, let him set down his instructions. But the Tathāgata has no such idea. Why should he then leave instructions concerning the Shangha? I am now old, Ānanda, eighty years old. As a worn-out cart has to be kept going by repairs, so, it seems to me, the body of the Tathāgata can only be kept going by repairs. Therefore, Ānanda, dwell making yourselves your island (support), making yourselves, not anyone else, your refuge; making the Dhamma your island (support), the Dhamma your refuge, nothing else your refuge. [22]
于是，佛充满了慈悲与人情，很温和地对他的忠心而深爱的侍者说：‘阿难啊！僧团对我还有什么企求呢！我以将法(真理)不分显密统统教给了你们。关于真理，如来掌中并无隐秘。当然啰，阿难，如果有人认为他应当领导僧团，僧团应当依靠他，他自应留下遗教。可是如来并没有这种念头。那末，他为什么要为僧团留下遗命呢？我现在已经年老，阿难啊！都八十岁了！用旧了的车子，须靠修理方能继续使用。同样的，在我看来，如来的色身，也只有靠修理才能继续活下去。因此，阿难啊！应当以你们自己为岛屿(支应)而安住，以你们自己而不以任何他人作为你们的皈依；以法为你们的岛屿(支应)，以法为你们的皈依，不以任何他物为你们的皈依处。’［注二十二］
What the Buddha wanted to convey to Ānanda is quite clear. The latter was sad and depressed. He thought that they would all be lonely, helpless, without a refuge, without a leader after their great Teacher's death. So the Buddha gave him consolation, courage, and confidence, saying that they should depend on themselves, and on Dhamma he taught, and not on anyone else, or on anything else. Here the question of a metaphysical Ātman, or Self, is quite beside the point.
佛向阿难说这些话的意向，是十分明显的。阿难本来非常忧郁。他认为他们大师死了，他们将全部变成孤单、无援、无所依怙。所以佛给他安慰、勇气与自信。告诉他们应该依靠自己，依靠他所传授的‘法’，而不依靠任何他人或物。在这里提出一个形而上的神我、自我的问题，实在是太离谱了。
Further, The Buddha explained to Ānanda how one could be one's own island or refuge, how one could make the Dhamma one's own island or refuge: through the cultivation of mindfulness or awareness of the body, sensations, mind and mind-objects (the four Satipatthānas). [23] There is no talk at all here about an Ātman or Self.
接著，佛还向阿难解释一个人应如何成为自己的岛屿或依怙，一个人应如何以‘法’为自己的岛屿和依怙：要养成念念分明。对自己的色身、感觉、心王、心所的一切动态，时时刻刻无不了然洞照(四念处)。［注二十三］在此，佛也完全没有谈到神我或自我。
Another reference, oft-quoted, is used by those who try to find Ātman in the Buddha's teaching. The Buddha was once seated under a tree in a forest on the way to Urevelā from Benares. On that day, thirty friends all of them young princes, went out on picnic with their young wives into the same forest. One of the princes who was unmarried brought a prostitute with him. While the others were amusing themselves, she purloined some objects of value and disappeared. In their search for her in the forest, they saw the Buddha seated under a tree and asked him whether he had seen a woman. He enquired what was the matter. When they explained, the Buddha asked them: “What do you think, young men? Which is better for you? To search after a woman, or to search after yourselves?' [24]
另外，还有一段想在佛教中觅神我的人所常常引用的资料。有一次，佛从波罗奈到优楼频螺去，在途中一座树林里的一棵树下安坐。那天，有三十个朋友，都是年轻的王子们，带著他们年轻的妻子，在这树林里野餐。有一个未婚的王子，带了一名妓女同来。当其他的人正在寻欢的时候，这妓女偷了些贵重的物品逃走了。王子们就在森林中找她，他们看见佛坐在树下，就问佛有没有见到一个女人。佛就问他们为了什么事儿。他们说明原委之后，佛就问他们：‘年轻人啊！你们意下如何？寻找一个女人呢？还是寻找你们自己？那一样对你们更有利啊？’［注二十四］
Here again it is a simple and natural question, and there is no justification for introducing far-fetched ideas of a metaphysical Ātman or Self into the business. They answered that it was better for them to search after themselves. The Buddha then asked them to sit down and explained the Dhamma to them. In the available account, in the original text of what the preached to them, not a word is mentioned about an Ātman.
这又是一个简单而自然的问题。硬要牵强附会的将形上的神我、自我等意念扯这门子官司里来，实在是说不通的。王子们答称还是寻找自己为妙。佛于是叫他们坐下，并为他们说法。在有案可稽的原文经典里，佛对他们所说法中，没有一个字涉及神我。
Much has been written on the subject of the Buddha's silence when a certain Parivrājaka (Wanderer) named Vacchagotta asked him whether there was an Ātman or not. The story is as follows:
关于游方者婆嗟种问佛是否有神我，佛缄口不答一事，已有人写了许多文章。故事是这样的：
Vacchagotta comes to the Buddha and asks:
婆嗟种来到佛处，问道：
'Venerable Gotama, is there an Ātman?'
‘可敬的乔答摩啊！神我是有的吗？’
The Buddha is silent.
佛缄口不答。
'The Venerable Gotama, is there an Ātman?'
‘那末，可敬的乔答摩，神我是没有的吗？’
Again the Buddha is silent.
佛还是缄口不答。
Vacchagotta gets up and goes away.
婆嗟种就站起来走了。
After the Parivrājaka had left, Ānanda asks the Buddha why he did not answer Vacchagotta's question. The Buddha explains his position:
这游方者走后，阿难问佛为什么不回答婆嗟种的问题。佛解释自己的立场说：
'Ānanda, when asked by Vacchagotta the Wanderer: “Is there a self?”, if I had answered: “There is a self”, then, Ānanda, that would be siding with those recluses and brāhmanas who hold the eternalist theory (sassata-vāda).
‘阿难，游方者婆嗟种问我：“有我吗？”如果我答：“有的”，那末，阿难，我就与持常见的梵志出家人站在一边了。
'And, Ānanda, when asked by the Wanderer: “Is there no self?” if I had answered: “There is no self”, then that would be siding with those recluses and brāhmanas who hold the annihilationist theory (uccheda-vāda). [25]
‘同时，阿难，游方者问我：“没有我吗？”如果我答：“没有！”那我就跟持断见的梵志出家人站在一边了。［注二十五］
'Again, Ānanda, when asked by Vacchagotta: “Is there a self?”, if I had answered: “There is a self”, would that be in accordance with my knowledge that all dhammas are without self?' [26]
‘再说，阿难，婆嗟种问我：“有我吗？”如果我答“有的！”这答案与我所知“一切法无我”［注二十六］符合吗？’
'Surely not, Sir.'
‘当然不符啰！世尊。’
'And again, Ānanda, when asked by the Wanderer: “Is there no self?” if I had answered: “There is no self”, then that would have been a greater confusion to the already confused Vacchagotta. [27] For he would have thought: Formerly indeed I had an Ātman (self), but now I haven't got one.' [28]
‘还有，阿难，游方者问我：“没有我吗？”如果我答：“没有！”那将使得本来已经糊里糊涂的婆嗟种［注二十七］越搅越糊涂了。他就会这样想：以前我倒还有一个神我(我)［注二十八］，而今却没有了。’［注二十九］
It should now be quite clear why the Buddha was silent. But it will be still clearer if we take into consideration the whole background, and the way the Buddha treated questions and questioners – which is altogether ignored by those who have discussed this problem.
佛陀为什么保持缄默，现在该很明白了。但如我们将全部背景，和佛对付问题及问话人的态度，也考虑在内，就会更加明白。可惜这种态度完全为讨论这问题的人所忽略了。
The Buddha was not a computing machine giving answers to whatever questions were put to him by another at all, without any consideration. He was a practical teacher, full of compassion and wisdom. He did not answer questions to show his knowledge and intelligence, but to help the questioner on the way to realization. He always spoke to people bearing in mind their standard of development, their tendencies, their mental make-up, their character, their capacity to understand a particular question. [29]
佛并不是一座计算机，不管什么人问什么样的问题，他都会不加思索的答覆。他是一位很踏实的导师，充满了慈悲与智慧。他并不是为了炫耀自己的才智知识而答问，而是为了要帮助问话人走上正觉的道路，他和人讲话时，时刻不忘对方的水准、倾向、根器、性格以及了解某一问题的能力。［注三十］
According to the Buddha, there are four ways of treating questions: (I) Some should be answered directly; (2) others should be answered by way of analyzing them; (3) yet others should be answered by counter-questions; (4) and lastly, there are questions which should be put aside. [30]
根据佛说，对付问题有四种方式：(一)某些问题必须直截了当的回答；(二)某些问题须以分析的方法解答；(三)另有一些问题须以反问为答覆；(四)最后，有一类问题须予以搁置。［注三十一］
There may be several ways putting aside a question. One is to day that a particular question is not answered or explained, as the Buddha had told this very same Vacchagotta on more than one occasion, when those famous questions whether the universe is eternal or not, etc., were put to him. [31] In the same way he had replied to Mālunkyaputta and others. But he could not say the same thing with regard to the question whether there is an Ātman (Self) or not, because he had always discussed and explained it. He could not say 'there is self', because it is contrary to his knowledge that 'all dhammas are without self'. Then he did not want to say 'there is no self', because that would unnecessarily, without any purpose, have confused and disturbed poor Vacchagotta who was already confused on a similar question, as he had himself admitted earlier. [32] He was not yet in a position to understand the idea of Anatta. Therefore, to put aside this question by silence was the wisest thing in this particular case.
搁置一个问题有许多方法。其中有一个方法就是说出这问题是不可解答的。有好几次同一的婆嗟种来问佛世界是否有常的时候，佛就是这样告诉他的。［注三十二］他对羁舍子以及其他的人，也是这样答覆的。但是对于有无神我的问题，他可不能同样地答覆，因为他一直都在讨论与解释这问题。他不能说‘有我’，因为它与他所知的一切法无我相违背。而他也不能说‘没有我’，因为这将毫无必要、毫无意义地增加婆嗟种的困扰。婆嗟种早就承认［注三十三］他本来已经为一则类似的问题所困惑。他尚未到能了解‘无我’的地步。因此，在这种特殊情形之下，保持缄默，将问题置之不答，就是最明智之举。
We must not forget too that the Buddha has known Vacchagotta quite well for a long time. This was not the first occasion on which this inquiring Wanderer had come to see him. The wise and compassionate Teacher gave much thought and showed great consideration for this confused seeker. There are many references in the Pali texts to this same Vacchagotta the Wanderer his going round quite often to see the Buddha and his disciples and putting the same kind of question again and again, evidently very much worried, almost obsessed by these problems. [33] The Buddha's silence seems to have had much more effect on Vacchagotta than any eloquent answer or discussion. [34]
尤其不可忘怀的是：佛认识婆嗟种已有多时。这位好问的游方者来访问佛陀，这也并不是第一次。智悲双运的导师，曾为这困惑的求法人煞费心机，并对他表示深切的关怀。在巴利文原典中，多处都提到这位游方者婆嗟种。他常常去见佛陀以及佛弟子们，三番两次向他们提出同样的问题，显然为了这些问题而十分烦闷，几乎到了著魔的程度。［注三十四］佛的缄默，对婆嗟种的影响，似乎要比任何雄辩滔滔的答案为大。［注三十五］
Some people take 'self' to mean what is generally known as 'mind' or consciousness. But the Buddha says that it is better for a man to take his physical body as self rather than mind, thought, or consciousness, because the former seems to be more solid than the latter, because mind, thought or consciousness (citta, mano, viňňāna) changes constantly day and night even faster than the body (kāya). [35]
有些人以为‘我’就是一般所谓的‘心’或知觉(识)。但是佛说，与其认心、思想(意)或知觉(识)为我，毋宁认色身为我，反倒好一点。因为色身比心识似乎较为坚实。心、意、识日夜迁流，远比色身的变化为速。［注三十六］
It is the vague feeling “I AM' that creates the idea of self which has no corresponding reality, and to see this truth is to realize Nirvāna, which is not very easy. In the Samyutta-nikāya [36] there is an enlightening conversation on this point between a bhikkhu named Khemaka and a group of bhikkhus.
造成‘我’的观念，是一种模模糊糊的‘我存在’的感觉。这‘我’的观念，并没有可以与之相应的实体。但能见到这一点，就是证入涅槃。这可不是一桩容易的事。在《杂部经》［注三十七］中，有一段差摩迦比丘与一群比丘谈论这一问题的会话，深能发人猛省。
These bhikkhus ask Khemaka whether he sees in the Five Aggregates any self or anything pertaining to a self. Khemaka replies 'No”. Then the bhikkhus say that, if so, he should be an Arahant free from all impurities. But Khemaka confesses that through he does not find in the Five Aggregates a self, or anything pertaining to a self, 'I am not an Arahant free from all impurities. O friends, with regard to the Five Aggregates of Attachment, I have a feeling “I AM”, but I do not clearly see “This is I AM”.' Then Khemaka explains that what he calls 'I AM' is neither matter, sensation, perception, mental formations, nor consciousness, nor anything without them. But he has he feeling 'I AM' with regard to the Five Aggregates, through he could not see clearly 'This is I AM'. [37]
这群比丘问差摩迦，他在五蕴中是否见到有‘我’或任何与‘我’有关的事物(我所)。差摩迦回说：‘没有。’于是，那群比丘们就说，假如这样，他应当已经是一位离尘绝垢的阿罗汉了。可是，差摩迦自承虽然他在五蕴中求‘我’与‘我所’不可得，‘但是我尚不是一位离尘绝垢的阿罗汉。同修们啊！关于五取蕴，我有一种“我存在”的感觉，但我并不能了了分明的见到“这就是我存在”。’接下去，差摩迦解释他所称为‘我存在’的东西，是非色、非受、非想、非行、非识，亦非在五蕴之外的任何一物。但他对五蕴有一种‘我存在’的感觉，却无法了了分明的见到‘这就是“我存在”。’［注三十八］
He says it is like the smell of a flower: it is neither the smell of the petals, nor of the colour, nor of the pollen, but the smell of the flower.
他说那就像是一朵花的香气，既不是花瓣香，也不是颜色香，也不是花粉香，而是花的香。
Khemaka further explains that even a person who has attained the early stages of realization still retains this feeling 'I AM'. But later on, when he progresses further, this feeling of 'I AM' altogether disappears, just as the chemical smell of a freshly washed cloth disappears after a time when it is kept in a box.
差摩迦进一步解释说，甚至已证初阶圣果的人，仍然保有‘我存在’的感觉。但是后来他向前进步的时候，这种‘我存在’的感觉就完全消失了。就像一件新洗的衣服上的化学药品气味，在箱子里放了一段时间之后，就会消失一样。
This discussion was so useful and enlightening to them that at the end of it, the text says, all of them, including Khemaka himself, became Arahants free from all impurities, this finally getting rid of 'I AM'.
这段议论对那群比丘们的作用之大、启发力之强，根据原典记载，他们所有的人，包括差摩迦自己在内，在议论完结之时，都成了离尘绝垢的阿罗汉，终于将‘我存在’铲除了。
According to the Buddha's teaching, it is as wrong to hold the opinion 'I have no self' (which is the annihilationist theory) as to hold the opinion 'I have self' (which is the eternalist theory), because both are fetters, both arising out of the false idea 'I AM'. The correct position with regard to the question of Anatta is not to take hold of any opinions or views, but to see things objectively as they are without mental projections, to see that what we call 'I', or 'being', is only a combination of physical and mental aggregates, which are working together interdependently in a flux of momentary change within the law of cause and effect, and that there is nothing permanent, everlasting, unchanging and eternal in the whole of existence.
根据佛的教诲，执持‘无我’的见解(断见)与执持‘有我’的见解(常见)是同样错误的。因为两者都是桎梏，两者都是从‘我存在’的妄见生起的。对于无我问题的正确立场，是不要执著任何意见或见地，应客观地、如实地去观察一切事物，不加以心意的造作。观察这所谓‘我’和‘众生’，只是精神与肉体的综合，在因果律的限制下，互为依存，刹那流变。在整个生存界内，绝无一物是恒常不变、亘古常新的。
Here naturally a question arises: If there is no Ātman or Self, who gets the results of karma (actions)? No one can answer this question better than the Buddha himself. When this question was raised by a bhikkhu the Buddha said: 'I have taught you, O bhikkhus, to see conditionality everywhere in all things.' [38]
当然，这就产生了一个问题：如果没有神我、自我，受业报的又是谁呢？没有一个人可以比佛本身更能解答这个问题了。有一个比丘提出这个问题的时候，佛说：‘我已经教过你了，比丘们啊！要在一切处、一切事、一切物中见缘起。’［注三十九］
The Buddha's teaching on Anatta, No-Soul, or No-Self, should not be considered as negative or annihilistic. Like Nirvāna, it is Truth, Reality; and Reality cannot be negative. It is the false belief in a non-existing imaginary self that is negative. The teaching on Anatta dispels the darkness of false beliefs, and produces the light of wisdom. It is not negative: as Asanga very aptly says: 'There is the fact of No-selfness' (nairātmyāstitā). [39]
佛所教的无我论、灵魂非有论或自我非有论，不应被视为消极的或断灭的。和涅槃一样，它是真理、实相；而实相绝不能是消极的。倒是妄信有一个根本不存在的、虚幻的我，才是消极的呢！无我的教诲，排除了妄信的黑暗，产生了智慧的光明。它不是消极的。无著说得好：‘无我性乃是事实。’［注四十］
[1] Mhvg. (Alutgama, 1922), p. 4 f; M I (PTS), p. 167 f.
[2] Explained below.
[3] M III (PTS), p. 63; S II (PTS), pp. 28, 95, etc. To put it into a modern from:
When A is, B is;
A arising, B arises;
When A is not, B is not;
A ceasing, B ceases.
[4] Vism. (PTS), p. 517
[5] See above p. 29
[6] Limited space does not permit a discussion here of this most important doctrine. A critical and comparative study if this subject in detail will be found in a forthcoming work on Buddhist philosophy by the present writer.
[7] Sārattha II (PTS), p. 77
[8] Mh. Sūtrālankāra, XVIII 92.
[9] H. von Glasenapp, in an article 'Vedanta and Buddhism' on the question of Anatta, The Middle Way, February, 1957, p. 154.
[10] The late Mrs. Rhys Davids and others. See Mrs. Rhys Davids' Gotama the Man, Sākya or Buddhist Origins, A Manual of Buddhism, What was the Original Buddhism, etc.
[11] M I (PTS), pp. 136-137
[12] Quoted in MA II (PTS), p. 112.
[13] F.L.Woodward's translation of the word dhammā here by 'All states by 'All states compounded' is quite wrong. (The Buddha's Path of Virtue, Adyar, Madras, India, 1929, p. 69.) 'All states compounded' means only samkhārā, but not dhammā.
[14] Samkhārā in the list of the Five Aggregates means 'Mental Formations' or 'Mental Activities' producing karmic effects. But here it means all conditioned or compounded things, including all the Five Aggregates. The term samkhārā has different connotations in different contexts.
[15] Cf. also Sabbesamkhārā aniccā 'All conditioned things are impermanent', Sabbe dhammā anattā 'All dhammas are without self'. M I (PTS), p. 228; S III pp. 132, 133.
[16] M I (PTS), p. 137
[17] ibid., p. 138. Referring to this passage, S. Radhakrishnan (Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, London, 1940, p. 485), says: 'It is the false view that clamours for the perpetual continuance of the small self that buddha refutes'. We cannot agree with this remark. On the contrary, the Buddha, in fact, refutes here the Universal Ātman or Soul. As we saw just now, in the earlier passage, the Buddha did not accept any self, great or small. In his view, all theories of Ātman were false, mental projections.
[18] In his article “Vendanta and Buddhism' (The Middle Way, February, 1957), H. von Glasenapp explains this point clearly.
[19] The commentary on the Dhp. Says: Nātho ti patitthā 'Nātho means support, (refuge, help, protection),' (Dph. A III (PTS), p. 148.) The old Sinhalese Sannaya of the Dph. Paraphrases the word nātho as pihita vanneya 'is a support (refuge, help)'. (Dhammapada Purānasannaya, Colombo, 1926, p. 77). If we take the negative form of nātho, this meaning becomes further confirmed: Anātha does not mean 'without a lord' or 'lordless', but it means 'helpless', 'supportless', 'unprotected, 'poor'. Even the PTS Pali Dictionary explains the word nātha as 'protector', 'refuge', 'help, but not as 'lord'. The translation of the lord Lokanātha (s.v.) by 'Saviour of the world', just using a popular Christian expression, is not quite correct, because the Buddha is not a saviour. This epithet really means 'Refuge of the World'
[20] D II (Colombo, 1929), p. 62
[21] Rhys Davids (Digha-nikāya Translation II, p. 108) 'Be ye lamps unto yourselves. Be ye a refuge to yourselves. Betake yourselves to no external refuge.'
[22] D II (Colombo, 1929), pp. 61-62. Only the last sentence is literally translated. The rest of the story is given briefly according to the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta.
[23] Ibid., p.62. For Satipatthāna see Chapter VII on Meditation.
[24] Mhvg., (Alutgama, 1929), pp.21-22
[25] On another accasion the Buddha had told this same Vacchagotta that the Tathāgata had no theories, because he had seen the nature of things. (M I (PTS), p. 486.) Here too he does not want to associate himself with any theorists.
[26] Sabbe dhammā anattā. (Exactly the same words as in the first line of Dhp. XX, 7 which we discussed above.) Woodward's translation of these words by 'all things are impermanent' (Kindred Sayings IV, p. 282) is completely wrong, probably due to an oversight. But this is a very serious mistake. This, perhaps, is one of the reasons for so much unnecessary talk on the Buddha's silence. The most important word in this context, anatta 'without a self' had been translated as 'impermanent'. The English translations of Pali texts contain major and minor errors of this kind-some due to carelessness or oversight, some to lack of proficiency in the original language. Whatever the cause may be, it is useful to mention here, with the deference due to those great pioneers in this field, that these errors have been responsible for a number of wrong ideas about Buddhism among people who have no access to the original texts. It is good to know therefore that Miss I. B. Horner, the Secretary of the Pali Text Society, plans to bring out revised and new translations.
[27] In fact on another occasion, evidently earlier, when the Buddha had explained a certain deep and subtle question-the question as to what happened to an Arahant after death-Vacchagotta said: 'Venerable Gotama, here I fall into ignorance, I get into confusion. Whatever little faith I had at the beginning of this conversation with the Venerable Gotama, that too is gone now.' (M I (PTS), p. 487). So the Buddha did not want to confuse him again.
[28] S IV (PTS), pp. 400-401
[29] This knowledge of the Buddha is called Indriyaparopariyattaňāna. M I (PTS), p. 70; Vibh. (PTS), p. 340.
[30] A (Colombo, 1929), p. 216.
[31] E.g., S IV (PTS), pp. 393, 395; M I (PTS), p. 484.
[32] See p. 63 n. 2.
[33] E.g., see S III (PTS), pp. 257-263; IV pp, 391f., 395 f., 398f., 400; MI, pp. 481f., 483f., 489f., A V p. 193
[34] For, we see that after sometime Vacchagotta came again to see the Buddham but this time did not ask any questions as usual, but said: “It is long since I had a talk with the Venerable Gotama. It would be good if the Venerable Gotama would preach to me on good and bad (kusalākusalam) in brief.” The Buddha said that he would explain to him good and bad, in brief as well as in detail; and so he did. Ultimately Vacchagotta became a disciple of the Buddha, and following his teaching attained Arahantship, realized Truth, Nirvāna, and the problems of Ātman and other questions obsessed him no more. (M I (PTS), pp. 489 ff.)
[35] S II (PTS), p. 94. Some people think that Ālayavijňāna 'Store-Consciousness' (Tathāgatagarbba) of Mahāyāna Buddhism is something like self. But the Lankāvatāra-sŭtra categorically says that it is not Ātman (Lanka. P. 78-79.)
[36] S III (PTS), pp. 126 ff.
[37] This is what most people say about self even today.
[38] M III (PTS), p. 19; S III, p. 103.
[39] Abhisamuc, p. 31.
注释：
一：见一九二二年阿陆葛玛版人品第四页以次各页以及巴利文学会版《中部经》第一集第一六七页以次各页。
二：见下文详解。
三：见巴利文学会版《中部经》第三集第六十三页，同版《杂部经》第二集第二十八、九十五等页。该式如以现代形式表现，则成下式：
甲存在则乙存在，甲生起则乙生起；
甲不存在则乙不存在，甲消灭则乙消灭。
四：见巴利文学会版《清净道论》第五一七页。
五：因受篇幅限制，在本书内无法讨论此一极为重要之教义。著者现正撰写另一佛教哲学著作，其中对此一课题将有较详尽之评议及比较研究。
六：见巴利文学会版《杂部经》觉音疏第二章第七十七页。
七：见《大乘庄严经论》第十八章第九十二节。
八：见一九五二年二月份中道季刊第一五四页葛拉生纳普氏H. von Glasenapp所著‘吠檀多与佛教’一文中有关无我问题之议论。
九：指现已逝世之瑞斯·戴维兹夫人Mrs. Rhys Davids及其他学者。见瑞斯·戴维兹夫人所著‘乔答摩其人’、‘释迦、佛教之起源’、‘佛教手册’、‘什么是原始佛教’等著。
十：见巴利文学会版《中部经》第一集第一三六、一三七页。
十一：巴利文学会版《中部经》觉音疏第二集第一一二页曾引用此语。
十二：乌德瓦氏 F.L. Woodward在‘佛的功德之路’(一九二九年玛德拉斯出版)一书中(见第六十九页)，将‘法’字译为‘一切复合的事物’，是很错误的。‘一切复合的事物’只是行，不是法。
十三：五蕴中的行蕴，是指‘心的造作’或‘心志的活动’，能产生业果。但此处的文字，乃指一切缘成的或复合的事物，包括所有五个蕴在内。所以，‘行’字在不同的章句，有不同的释义。
十四：参照比较‘诸行无常’、‘诸法无我’两句。见巴利文学会版《中部经》第一集第二、八页及《杂部经》第二集第一三二、一三三两页。
十五：见巴利文学会版《中部经》第一集第一三七页。
十六：见巴利文学会版《中部经》第一集第一三八页。谈到这一段文字的时候，罗达吉须南氏S. Radhakrishnan说：‘佛所破斥的，乃是闹轰轰地要求小我永久续存的妄见。’(见该氏所著一九四零年伦敦出版之“印度之哲学”一书第四八五页)我们对这话不能同意。相反的，佛实际上破斥的神我(亦称灵魂)。前一段文中刚刚说明，佛并不接受任何我见，不分大小。他的见地是：所有神我的理论，都是虚妄的、心造的影像。
十七：葛拉生纳普在他所著‘吠檀多与佛教’一文中(一九五七年三月份中道季刊)，
对此点曾有详晰之阐释。
十八：巴利文《法句经》注称中说：‘Natho ti patittha一句中natho为支援义(依怙、救助、保护)’(见《法句经》觉音疏第二章第一四八页。巴利文学会版)。古锡兰文‘法句经规矩’中，将natho一字代以pihita vaneya‘, 乃一支柱(依怙、救助)’字样。(见一九二六年哥仑坡出版之Dhammapada puranasannaya第七十七页。)如果我们研究 natho的反义字anatha，这意义就更为确定。Anatha的意义不是‘没有一个主宰’或‘无主’，而是‘无助’、‘无支应’、‘无保护’、‘贫乏’。甚至巴利文学会版之巴利文字典中，亦将 natho释为‘保护者’、‘皈依处’、‘救助’，不作‘主宰’。但该字典中将 Lokanatho一字译为‘世间之救主’，以通俗之基督教名词用在此处，实属未尽恰当，因为佛并不是救主。这一称号的实际意义，乃是‘世间的皈依处’。
十九：见一九二九年哥仑坡版《长部经》第二集第六十二页。
二十：见瑞斯·戴维兹英译《长部经》第二集第一零八页：‘应自作明灯，应自作皈依，勿向身外觅皈依处。’
二十一：Dipa一字在此不作灯解，实作洲(岛)解。《长部经》注解中(见《长部经》觉音疏第三八零页)论dipa一字时说：‘应将自己作为一个岛屿，一个休息处而安住，犹如大洋中的一个岛一样。’相续不断的生死，通常都以大海作譬，所谓生死大海。而在海中求安全，要找的应该是岛屿、一片坚实的土地，而不是一盏灯。
二十二：见一九二九年哥仑坡版《长部经》第二集第六十一、六十二两页。只有最后一句是按字义翻译的。故事的其余部份，是根据《大般涅槃经》所作的简略叙述。
二十三：见一九二九年哥仑坡版《长部经》第二集第六十二页。关于四念处，请参阅本书第七章‘修习：心智的培育’。
二十四：见一九二九年阿陆葛玛版大品第二十一、二十二两页。
二十五：另有一次，佛曾面告这同一个婆嗟种：如来没有任何理由，因为他已亲身证知一切事物的本性。(见巴利文学会版《中部经》第一集第四八六页)。在这方面，他也不愿意和任何理论家发生关系。
二十六： Sae dhamma anatta一语(与巴利文《法句经》第二十章第七偈第一句全同。该偈前文已论及)，乌德瓦氏将它译成‘一切事物皆是无常’(见英译《杂部经》第四集第二八二页)是完全错了；但也许是由于疏忽。可是这错误甚为严重。关于佛的缄默，会有这么多闲话，也许这也是原因之一。因为在这一句中，最重要的一个anatta‘无我’被译成‘无常’了。英译巴利文佛典中，颇有不少这类大大小小的错误——有些是由于粗心疏忽，有些是因为对原文中的文字不够熟谙。对从事这项工作的那些伟大创业者，我十分敬仰。但是不论原因若何，都有必要申明：这些错误已使无法阅读原文的人，对佛教产生了偏见。因此，据悉巴利文学会的秘书(译者按：现已升任会长)荷纳小姐Miss I.b. Horner现已计画出版修正的新译本，实在是一桩好消息。
二十七：事实上，在另一次机缘中(显然在此次之前)，佛阐释某一深奥的问题——关于阿罗汉死后如何的问题之后，婆嗟种道：‘可敬的乔答摩啊！这一下我变傻了，我搅糊涂了。在刚同可敬的乔答摩讨论这一问题时，我尚具有的一点点信心，现在也统统消失了。’(巴利文学会版《中部经》第一集第四八七页)。因此，佛不愿再把他搅糊涂。
二十八：此处作者虽用Atman，(大写的A)但pali文根本无Capital，亦无Punctuation所以并不一定指的是神我或大我。此处是佛以幽默的口吻说的，此处之我，只是泛指的我而已。——张澄基识
二十九：见巴利文学会版《杂部经》第四集第四零零、四零一两页。
三十：佛的这一智力，叫做根上下智力。见巴利文学会版《中部经》第一集第七十页及同版《清净道论》第三四零页。
三十一：见一九二九年哥仑坡《增支部经》第二一六页。
三十二：例如，巴利文学会版《杂部经》第四集第三九三、三九五页及同版《中部经》第一集第四八四页。
三十三：见注廿七。
三十四：例如巴利文学会版《杂部经》第三集第二五七——二六三页；第四集第三九一页以次，三九五页以次，三九八页以次，以及第四零零页；《中部经》第一集第四八一页以次，四八三页以次，四八九页以次各页；《增支部经》第五集第一九三页。
三十五：因为，过了一段时间，婆嗟种又来见佛。但这次他来，并没有和往常一样的问问题。只是说：‘我和可敬的乔答摩已多时未晤谈了。如果可敬的乔答摩能为我简单地说说善不善法，那就太好了。’佛说他将为婆嗟种亦详亦略的解说善不善法，接著就照办了。最后婆嗟种成了佛弟子，依教奉行，得罗汉果，证见真理、涅槃，而不再为神我以及其他问题所蛊惑。见《中部经》第一集第四八九页起。
三十六：见巴利文学会版《杂部经》第二集第九十四页。有人以为大乘佛教中的阿赖耶识(藏识、如来藏)与‘我’相似。但是《入楞伽经》中曾斩钉截铁地说明它不是神我。见东京一九二三年南条文雄订正《入楞伽经》第七十八、七十九两页。
三十七：见巴利文学会版《杂部经》第三集第一二六页以次各页。
三十八：即使在今日，多数人对于‘我’仍然作此说法。
三十九：见巴利文学会版《中部经》第三集第十九页；《杂部经》第三集第一零三页。
四十：见《阿毗达摩集论》第卅一页。
